Summary: Great Britain has remained practically free from foot-and-mouth disease since the last major outbreak of 1967-1968, 
INTRODUCTION
The previous papers of this Symposium have been concerned with recent research and investigations which are giving a better understanding of the nature of the virus of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and the mechanisms by which it is spread. The purpose of this contribution is to have a look at the field situation during the last few years in Europe and to consider what impact research has had on the control of the disease.
INCIDENCE OF THE DISEASE IN THE UK
The incidence of the disease in the UK is given in Table I . In the last 17 years, i.e. since the major outbreak of 1967-68, there has undoubtedly been a remarkable change in the pattern of disease outbreaks in this country. Before 1967, there were sporadic outbreaks most years, with a gap of 2 years during 1963 and 1964 when there were none. The term sporadic is used in that although there were many outbreaks they were all controlled by the stamping out policy and the disease was never considered to be endemic in the UK. In the 1967-68 episode this nearly happened and in November of 1967 the curve of the daily reportings of new outbreaks appeared to be almost exponential. Just prior to the peak of the curve, serious consideration was given to the use of vaccine as an additional control procedure and, in fact, a stock of vaccine had been purchased and was available. Fortunately the trend became downward and the decision to use vaccine did not have to be made -otherwise if outbreaks had continued an endemic situation might have resulted and there would certainly have been a problem in knowing how to deal subsequently with the vaccinated population that would have been created. The 1974 outbreak was due to type C virus and this coincided with the much bigger number of outbreaks (89) due to the same virus serotype in Brittany. Again in 1981, the type O outbreaks in Jersey and the Isle of Wight coincided with the large epizootic in pigs in Normandy. Earlier papers in this Symposium described how research into the rates of virus excretion, airborne survival and analysis of weather conditions made it possible to predict what the outcome of these French outbreaks was likely to be. Also the newer biochemical methods of comparing virus strains showed the great similarity, if not identical characteristics, of the viruses in the coinciding outbreaks.
Apart from these two episodes, however, the 17 year period from mid-1968 until the present time has shown a very different pattern compared with the 10 years before. There has obviously been a very significant change.
If epidemiology is about the incidence, the mechanisms of spread and understanding the life cycle of the infective agent, then control is very much concerned with how to break into that life cycle and so prevent propagation of the organism and continuance of the disease. In the UK several factors have contributed to this becoming possible.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONTROL OF FMD IN THE UK
Some of the most important factors are given in Table II . One of the most signifi cant, which has contributed to the control of the disease, has come from the recom mendations of the Northumberland Committee -i.e. the UK no longer imports whole carcass meat, and only boned and/or jointed meat from which the lymph glands have been removed is brought into the country. There is no doubt that on many occasions in the past, carcasses of cattle in the prodromal stages of the disease, with virus sur viving in bone marrow and lymphatic tissue, must have been introduced. In stopping the importation of whole carcasses, one is reducing the opportunity for introduction and also the amount of virus available to initiate primary outbreaks. Allowing the virus entry is one factor, presenting it to the susceptible population is another. One route which must have caused many outbreaks in the past was the use of swill or garbage for the feeding of pigs. Waste food, including offal, bones, etc. containing virus fed to pigs without proper heat treatment must have caused many outbreaks.
The 1972 outbreak of swine vesicular disease (SVD) highlighted the very unsatisfac tory state of affairs in relation to swill feeding of pigs in the UK. Control via the 1957 legislation was not effective. Local Authorities were not able to supervise premises adequately and there were loopholes in the law; e.g. farmers with only one or two pigs were not required to be licensed. The 1973 legislation put control in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and was much tougher -i.e. there had to be pre-treatment areas for food collection and processing and also a clean area for treated swill. The design of the premises had to be such that pigs could not have access to the pre-treated food. The efficiency of the plant had to be adequate, i.e. it really did boil the food and not just warm it as in so many of the older establishments. These new requirements had a very beneficial effect in that many of the poorer establishments could not meet the new conditions and went out of business. The number of swill feeding premises reduced from over 4,000 to under 1,100. The effect of these new regulations has been that not only are the benefits related to SVD, but also any other disease associated with transmission by feeding, such as FMD. Small amounts of virus in lymphatic tissues that are brought into the country are prevented from making contact with susceptible pigs as a result of the tightening up of the conditions for feeding swill.
The third factor contributing to the improved situation is the much reduced in cidence of the disease on the continent of Europe. In the past, many of the outbreaks in the UK may have resulted from virus from outbreaks in countries bordering the Channel reaching cattle in this country.
One of the early popular theories on transmission was that birds brought the virus on their feathers and feet. However, in view of the work done on aerosol transmis sion over the sea, it would be plausible to think that these coastal outbreaks resulted from windborne transmission. There were many such outbreaks in the UK during November 1951 to April 1952.
In France alone in 1952 there were 320,000 outbreaks and there were also very large numbers in the Netherlands. The conditions existed, therefore, relatively close by, to promote the transmission of virus to the UK. Subsequently it was a result of combined policies of veterinary zoo-sanitary measures and mass vaccination that the downward trend in outbreaks was achieved and in many respects Europe can be regard ed as one of the real success stories in bringing FMD under control. Table III shows that our nearest neighbours across the Channel are continuing, by and large, to main tain that control. --
THE EUROPEAN SITUATION
With respect to other parts of Europe where the situation is not as favourable, Table IV shows the FMD position in 1983-1985. It can be seen that several countries had small numbers of outbreaks. Of particular importance were the two outbreaks of Asia 1 in Greece, a serotype exotic to Europe. Also it is worth noting that two near neighbours, namely Turkey and the USSR, reported outbreaks due to A 22 , a variant of serotype A which is also exotic to Europe.
FMD IN ITALY
At present the main interest in Europe is centred on the epizootic in Italy. Startting in Modena in November of last year, there haVe been 152 outbreaks so far.
The origin of the outbreak is still obscure; however, it may be of some significance that Modena is an important trading centre for young cattle brought into Italy from The AVRI has been collaborating with the Brescia Institute on characterisation of the strain responsible. The virus is clearly of the A 5 subgroup and indistinguishable from the strain isolated in 1962 at Parma and developed into a vaccine strain.
The virus genetics group at Pirbright have been examining a number of isolates collected sequentially from outbreaks with the aim of following evolutionary changes in the strain under these field conditions. They have examined 25 isolates collected during November 1984 to mid-February of this year. Three isolates from early December, late December and mid-January are indistinguishable from the Parma vaccine strain. The method used is analysis of the coat proteins by iso-electric focusing. Of the other 22 isolates, 40% are altered in one polypeptide, 44% in two polypeptides and 4% in 3 polypeptides. It is of interest, however, that the VP1, i.e. the major immunising protein, was unchanged in all the isolates examined.
Such changes are a clear indication that the virus is evolving under these conditions at a faster rate than seen before -e.g. during the O, outbreak in 1967/68 in the UK. This may be due to selective pressures on the virus in semi-immune animals resulting from recent vaccination programmes.
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
Those European countries which rely on prophylactic campaigns use trivalent vaccines containing serotypes O, A and C only. Their animal populations are thus susceptible to exotic serotypes such as Asia 1 and A 22 .
The most likely route of introduction of these exotic strains is through south-eastern Europe in the region of Thrace. Last year there were two outbreaks in Grecian Thrace due to Asia 1. Several times in the past, European livestock have been threatened by this route as shown in Fig. 1 . Last year's episode occurred in the Evros Delta, about 3 miles from the Turkish border. This region is included in the buffer zone and has been the area of emergency vaccination campaigns against exotic situations in the past, i.e. SAT 1 -1962 , A 22 -1965 , Asia 1 -1973 and again in 1984 The FAO, through the European Commission for the Control of FMD, and also the OIE have, over the years, been very active in establishing and promoting the buf fer zone and have advised and co-ordinated on funding and setting up of extensive areas of vaccination in the region.
P. Stouraitis -1985 FIG. 1 So far the exotic strains have not penetrated into Europe and it is hoped that the buffer zone will continue to prove effective in further threats. However, with modern transport and movement not only of animals but also people (i.e. tourists) there is an increasing possibility of virus bypassing the buffer zone and causing an exotic out break somewhere in Europe. It is against this threat that European veterinary authorities are considering the possibility of setting up an emergency vaccine bank based upon storage of inactivated exotic strain antigens, similar, in principle, to that which has been established at AVRI on behalf of the UK and a number of countries normally free of the disease. 
